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Abstract
In this article, the concept of “liberal democracy” and its implications for biotechnology 
such as human genetic engineering will be examined. Liberal democracy is characterised 
by a number of features, some of which has extensive repercussions on biotechnology, 
especially concepts such as the equal protection of human rights, civil rights, civil 
liberties, political freedom for all people and autonomy and libertarianism. Advocates 
of human genetic engineering for purposes other than the healing of genetically 
transmitted diseases often appeal to these features in the quest for its legalisation. I 
will examine whether the attributes of liberal democracy would indeed justify the use 
of this type of biotechnology and if yes, what a possible theological response would be, 
drawing on the political theology of Jürgen Moltmann. 
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1. Introduction
Biotechnology and aspects of liberal democracy have been closely linked 
together from the very beginning, with Robert Nozick, the father of 
libertarianism coining the phrase “the genetic supermarket”, which I use 
in the title of this article, already in 1974 in Anarchy, State and Utopia. 
As Colin Gavaghan indicates, the great virtue of the genetic supermarket, 
1 Note: Paper delivered at the annual conference of the Theological Society of South 
Africa, with the theme Citizens or Subjects? Theological and ethical reflection on 
participatory democracy in South Africa, hosted in Potchefstroom, 18-20 June 2014.
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for Nozick, is that it “involves no centralised decision fixing the future of 
human type(s)” (2007:1). Forty years after Nozick expounded his theory 
of libertarianism, where justice is identified with the idea of liberty where 
each person is free to act in whatever way he or she chooses and, as long 
as they are not harming the liberty of another person, this liberty may not 
be interfered with (Shaw 2005:34), biotechnology has developed in ways he 
perhaps never imagined. 
Religion and theology cannot be kept out of the public sphere, also when 
it comes to bioethical discussion on biotechnology, such as human genetic 
engineering. Richard Neuhaus refers to the impossibility of sustaining 
what he calls the “religious evacuation of the public square”, indicating 
that when traditional or identifiable religion becomes barred from the 
public sphere, this does not mean that religion retreats from the public 
sphere. Rather, the void left by the exclusion of religion will be filled by 
ersatz religion, “religion bootlegged into public space under other names” 
(Neuhaus 1984:80, quoted in Lombard 2011:239).
This aspect is especially relevant to the notion of biotechnology, where a 
phrase such as “playing God”, at its very core a religious expression, is often 
also used in secular discourses without accounting for the way that it is 
utilised or the intended meaning. 
Biotechnological treatments such as genetic engineering (GE), also of 
human beings, are challenging Christian theological ethics in new ways 
and requiring responses that keep up with the development of technology. 
Advocates of the use of GE often appeal to the various features of liberal 
democracy, with notions of liberty, the freedom and autonomy of parents 
to make decisions regarding their children, also in terms of their genetic 
makeup, being demanded. Notions that are central to liberal democracy 
such as separation of powers, the equal protection of human rights, civil 
rights, civil liberties, and political freedom for all people, autonomy and 
libertarianism have obvious repercussions for an ethical response to 
biotechnology. In this paper, I will examine whether a Christian bioethical 
response to the notions of autonomy and liberty as challenges raised by 
human genetic engineering is valuably informed by the political theology 
of Jürgen Moltmann, a relevant theologian to offer guidance in this regard, 
as has he offered explicit pronouncements regarding genetic engineering. 
203Kotzé  •  STJ 2015, Vol 1, No 1, 201–215
In addition, concepts that this article deals with, such as freedom and 
autonomy, play an important role in his theology.
2. Liberal democracy and biotechnology: Autonomy
For some, as Gavaghan postulates, the concern is with what they view 
as the inherently hubristic, sacrilegious and dehumanising connotations 
of a technology that would allow the present generation to choose their 
successors. Others have more concrete concerns, deriving from the fear 
that people will be harmed, devalued or treated unjustly (Gavaghan 2007:2). 
Sondra Wheeler also indicates that reproductive autonomy has attained 
much of its prevalence in the continuing discussion of abortion and has 
been “understood as the individual’s right to freedom from interference 
or constraint in the exercise of his or her reproductive capacity, including 
choices about conception, contraception, and termination of pregnancy” 
(2003:241). Francis Fukuyama further states:
The most important threat posed by contemporary biotechnology 
is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move 
us into a ‘post human’ stage of history. This is important … because 
human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a 
stable continuity to our experience as a species. It is, conjointly with 
religion, what defines our most basic values. (Fukuyama 2002:7)
Autonomy is also of crucial importance in a liberal democracy and is also 
closely tied to the notion of liberty. As Russell Blackford point out, one of 
the aspects where biotechnology such as GE is often critiqued is what is 
regarded as a threat to autonomy. While there are numerous variations of 
these points of criticism, the two main notions that are most often suggested 
is that either the resulting child and/or society’s liberal political values will 
be threatened by the use of GE (2014:51). The gist of the argument used most 
frequently implies that knowing one’s person and personality had not only 
been shaped by early education and upbringing, but also through genetic 
intervention, directly undermines one’s autonomy. As George Annas puts 
it, too much control in the hands of parents violated the autonomy of their 
children (2005:41).
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Jürgen Habermas, who have perhaps crafted the most well known and most 
elaborate argument in this regard, goes one step further and adds that not 
only is the autonomy of children born after GE threatened, but also the 
values of modern liberal societies (Blackford 2014:51). Habermas argues 
that the irreversible decision to alter the “organic disposition” of another 
person will restrict “the fundamental symmetry that exists among free and 
equal persons” in modern societies (2003:14). We will not be able to come 
to the self-understanding of being what he terms “the undivided authors 
of our lives” (Habermas 2003:49) or be able to develop a perspective of 
other people as “persons of equal birth” (Habermas 2003:62). Margaret 
Somerville relies heavily on Habermas’s perspective and summarises the 
problem at hand by indicating that ‘designed children’ cannot be equal 
to the designer and that any genetic intervention in the potentiality of a 
human being is a form of present tyranny over the future (2007:214-215). 
Michael Sandel further postulates that in order to think of ourselves as 
free, we have to be able to understand our origin as having a beginning that 
is beyond the disposal of another human being (2007:81-83). 
On the other side of the argument, as Blackford indicates, however, 
this is not a self-evident claim and one for which Sandel does not offer 
empirical support. While all of us undoubtedly would fear falling prey to 
someone (or something) that would be able to reshape our most primary 
and deep-seated desires, the reason is that future interferences would alter 
and destroy our present personalities and hopes. Past actions cannot be 
viewed in the same way, even if our present have been shaped by them, 
because most parental action form the attributes, beliefs and capacities of 
a developing child (2014:60-61). He also further indicates that it would be 
misleading to claim that any of us are primarily responsible for our own 
desires and characteristics and cites CAJ Coady, who indicates that no 
person can “regard themselves as the sole authors of their own life history, 
there is too much contingency and inevitable dependence on others for that 
to be plausible” (Coady 2009:174, quoted in Blackford 2014:66). 
Blackford uses the hypothetical example of Arnold, who at the age of 19 
learns that his robust build is not only because of the good nutrition and 
opportunities for exercise his parents provided as he was growing up, but 
also genetic tweaking for the potential to develop strong muscles. Blackford 
asks why the genetic, as well as environmental interventions made by 
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Arnold’s parents, should make him feel burdened? He indicates that there 
is no comprehensive control and that Arnold is by no means a puppet; his 
parents leave wide open “what worldview he might come to accept, what 
creative and other pleasures he might take up, what attitudes he might bring 
to such conflicting priorities as work and family, and what temperament he 
might have” (2014:62). For this reason, Nick Bostrom argues that “being 
healthy, smarter, having a wide range of talents, or possessing greater 
powers of self-control are blessings that tend to open more life paths than 
they block” (2005:212). For Blackford, there is an inherent inequality 
between parents and children, because the very existence of children is 
dependent on their parents (2014:67), and for this reason, the autonomy of 
children cannot be said to be violated by their parents through the use of 
biotechnology in any greater degree than already happens naturally.
It might therefore be convincingly argued that the utilisation of GE 
does not necessarily mean that autonomy has to be threatened. While 
some points of criticism are addressed admirably by the advocates of 
biotechnology, such as Habermas’s notion of being the author of our own 
life, others remain in balance, such as the other concept he raises, namely 
viewing all people of being of equal worth. I will return to this idea shortly. 
It is still not clear, however, how one might respond to this issue from a 
theological perspective. Before I turn to the political theology of Jürgen 
Moltmann for guidance on this matter, it is important to take note that 
the defence of biotechnology on the grounds of personal liberty and that 
it does not undermine the autonomy of either the individual being altered 
or the values of the liberal state is essentially an extremely individualistic 
argument and one that does not take the interrelationship between people 
into account. Making our children healthier or smarter, or giving them 
more talents and self-control also means that there are others who do not 
have access to the biotechnology to do the same for their children or to put 
it even more bluntly, cannot afford to2.
In formulating his theory of libertarianism, Nozick also argued that it might 
be necessary to restrict the liberty of some in order to enhance the liberty 
of others (1974). This type of argumentation, one that also takes equality 
2 See Kotzé, M 2014. Human Genetic Engineering in the South African Context with its 
Inequalities: A Discourse on Human Rights and Human Dignity. Scriptura, 113.
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and equal opportunity, two other important features of liberal democracy, 
into account, is sorely lacking from this kind of defence. One aspect that 
comes to the fore very strongly in the discussion on autonomy, as has also 
been mentioned earlier, is the notion of liberty. Wheeler postulates that 
reproductive autonomy is primarily a negative right, the right to remain 
free from any intrusion or intervention, rather than a positive right such 
as a claim to help (2003:242). In the next section, this notion of freedom in 
terms of reproductive autonomy will be briefly discussed, before turning to 
a possible theological response.
3. Liberal democracy and parental liberty
In her discussion of reproductive autonomy, Wheeler also differentiates 
between liberty as the freedom from all forms of interference, the liberty 
espoused by liberal democracy, and parental liberty, which does not focus 
on the freedom of a single individual, but rather “on the significance of a 
certain, crucial relationship whose importance to individuals and to social 
groups is hard to overstate” (2003:243). The scope of parents’ influence and 
concern over the lives of their children and as a result also over the wider 
society is immense.
For that reason, parental freedom is protected, as parents should not 
only nurture and protect their children, but also provide them with value 
structures and a consistent worldview, parental liberty is not arbitrary, but 
directed towards an end; “to foster, facilitate, and protect the vital role of the 
parent, directly for the sake of the child who is to be cared for, and indirectly 
and secondarily for the sake of the wider society into which the child will 
enter when grown” (Wheeler 2003:244). In short, Wheeler therefore argues 
that while personal and individual freedom and the freedom from any and 
all interference seem to be the focus in liberal democracy, there are also 
some restrictions to this liberty. To a certain degree, parental liberty in 
intervene and even override the freedom of their children are allowed and 
encouraged when it is for the betterment of the child and, accordingly, for 
the rest of the society that child will become part of. On this basis, one 
could say that the genetic intervention, when done for the enhancement of 
the child in question, should also be left to the parents’ discretion as part of 
the social protected parental liberty.
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Referring directly to the alteration of genetic makeup, Wheeler argues 
that parental liberty is accepted and protected because its focus is on the 
wellbeing of children, as well as the wider society indirectly, it follows 
that “any proposed intervention must pass the tests of being undertaken 
directly and primarily for the sake of the child rather than the parents of 
other parties” (2003:248). There is therefore a distinct difference between 
modifying the genetic composition of a future child in order to prevent a 
genetic disease than would cause considerable suffering to the child, and 
simply selecting traits that the parents subjectively view as being more 
socially desirable.
Wheeler sees liberty as more than just individual freedom, an aspect that is 
also located in the work of Jürgen Moltmann, who in his newer publications 
also explicitly refer to the issue of genetic engineering, indicating that 
alterations that aim to cure and heal are “of course … permissible” 
(1999:126). In Wheeler’s words, modifications that focus on the wellbeing 
of the child and, to a lesser extent, society, and not the preferences parents 
might have. This is also evident in his theology. In the last section, I now 
turn to Moltmann’s theology as a theological response to the notions of 
liberty and autonomy in liberal democracy. Moltmann is a relevant and 
appropriate theologian to offer guidance in this regard, given that not 
only has he recently offered explicit statements on the issue of genetic 
engineering, but also given that notions such as freedom and autonomy 
are central to his theology. Additionally, Moltmann has engaged with the 
public sphere since the publication of his first book, Theology of Hope, and 
has presented a public theology that does not function in isolation, but 
engages with society, polity, structures, organizations and civil society.
4. A theological response: Jürgen Moltmann on human 
dignity and Christian freedom
Through his many books, Jürgen Moltmann constantly offers an 
impassioned appeal for the church to engage with the world by calling the 
world to justice, liberation, and environmental stewardship. To accomplish 
this aim, he has been a staunch advocate for Christian engagement also 
with political structures. 
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For Moltmann, political theology is not theology about the political, but the 
analysing and reconstructing of theology as a whole in light of its political 
functions, designating the field in which Christian theology should be 
articulated, but the content is not derived from the situation (Rasmussen 
1995:47). 
Moltmann indicates that political theology is not a new dogma, but rather 
theology that is aware of its political function. In his opinion, a-political 
theology does not exist, only theology that is politically naïve, so to speak 
(1984:153).
Two notions are of special importance in the response to the concepts of 
autonomy and liberty as found in liberal democracy and in this section, I 
discuss Moltmann’s view on human dignity and Christian freedom, before 
a theological response to the challenges posed by GE will be formulated in 
the conclusion. 
4.1 Human dignity
Human dignity is one of the most important guiding principles in 
Moltmann’s theology.
Willem Fourie also indicates that human dignity is inherently bound up to 
the Protestant principles identified by Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, Traugott 
Jähnichen, Sigrid Reihs, Hans-Richard Reuter, and Gerhard Wegner for 
a Christian social ethics, a subdivision of Christian ethics interested in 
institutions, systems and processes. Protestant social ethics ensues from the 
Reformation’s core principle, namely, that God has granted every human 
being inalienable dignity. This is also then the first principle identified 
in Bedford-Strohm et al’s principles for a Protestant social ethics. The 
second principle is that this dignity enables human beings to participate in 
God’s reality in love, to also serve others. The third principle denotes that 
people should discover their own gifts and capabilities in the realisation 
of this dignity. These three principles lead to the remaining principles, 
the vision of society in the social ethical perspective. For this reason, the 
fourth principle indicates that for a society to be described as just, it should 
operate in a manner that the dignity of human beings is respected and 
the freedom of the individual is increased by the operation of the state, 
economy, science and civil society. The fifth principle affirms that this 
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dignity and freedom in a space where people are able to realise their calling, 
caring for themselves and others. This principle is also dependent on the 
realisation of the sixth principle, which states that justice is the enabling of 
equal opportunities to all people. The seventh principle indicates that the 
unequal distribution of wealth and property can only be tolerated when it 
is to the benefit of the least well-off member of society3, while the eighth 
principle condemns any system of distribution that harm the dignity and 
freedom of people to serve others as part of their calling and that creates 
system that value wealth and property as ends in themselves. The ninth 
principle reiterates the importance of freedom, solidarity and justice in 
a social market economy. Principles seven, eight and nine are all linked 
to just systems of wealth distribution, while the last principle pronounces 
the potential that social ethics holds to contribute to the development of 
human systems, institutions and societal processes (2013:2-4).
Quite obviously, this is an extremely relevant system of principles to use in 
the discussion on political theology and liberal democracy.
These principles are then not compatible with the highly individualistic 
notions of autonomy and liberty than advocates of GE appeal to. While 
it might be argued that the discovering of talents and gifts being the 
realisation of dignity and that these endowments might enable one to 
also serve others, none of the supporters of biotechnology cite this as 
their reasons. The notions of inequality and distributive justice that these 
principles highlight are also not responded to by advocates like Blackford 
and Bostrom.
Human dignity is both the root of human rights and the bond unifying 
different categories of rights, be it protective rights, the rights to freedom, 
social rights or rights of participation (Moltmann 1999:119). Moltmann 
further clarifies that human dignity is not the elevation of human 
beings above other living things and cannot be upheld at the expense of 
nature (1999:120).4 Individual and social rights also belong together and 
3 This is also one of the principles identified by John Rawls in his theory of social justice 
articulated in his A Theory of Justice (1971).
4 See also Moltmann (2011:611) and Bauckham (1995:17).
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one cannot take precedence over the other (Moltmann 1999:123-124).5 
Moltmann explains it in the following way:
The fact that all human beings are made in the image of God is the 
foundation of human dignity. Human beings are intended to live 
in this relation to God. That gives their existence its inalienable, 
transcendent depth dimension. In their relationship to the transcen-
dent God, human beings become persons whose dignity must not be 
infringed. (Moltmann 1999:122)
Moltmann further describes human beings as made in the image of God as 
pertaining to the human being “in allen seinen Lebensbezügen” (1984:169), 
in other words, the economic, social, political and personal dimensions are 
meant to reflect the confession that we are created in God’s image. 
Human dignity, Moltmann states, is already defined in the Old Testament: 
“The Abrahamic religions – Judaism, Christianity and Islam – are 
responsible for the religious background of Western civilizations, and they 
have always seen this dignity as belonging to the human being as the image 
of God” (2012:87).6 For a long time, this dignity was viewed as something 
that resided in the human soul, not in the body, and through this perspective 
the body came to be viewed as something that does not form part of the 
likeness to God and that the soul could simply make use of. Still later, the 
likeness to God came to be seen as “the conscious subjectivity of will and 
perception” (Moltmann 2012:87). However, as Moltmann is quick to point 
out, it is the whole of the human being that is the image of God, his or her 
body included (2012:87). For the discussion of human dignity within the 
sphere of the larger Christian bioethical debate on GE, the implications of 
this affirmation are that human dignity also refers to bodily dignity.
This also further means that human dignity should apply equally to all 
human beings, solely on the basis of their being human, and picks up on 
one of the points of criticism raised earlier by Habermas, namely that 
autonomy is violated in that altered individuals might not be able to view 
all people as being born equal and with equal worth.
5 See also Moltmann (1984:170-172; 1993c:181).
6 See also Moltmann (2012a:87-88).
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Another important notion in Moltmann’s theology that has a direct impact 
on the notion of biotechnology in the discussion of liberal democracy is 
freedom, given that the idea of liberty, and especially personal liberty, plays 
such an important role in the arguments in favour of GE. 
4.2 Freedom
In Church Dogmatics I/II section 28, Karl Barth, in an attempt to mediate 
between the concepts of liberty and God’s goodness, defined God as “the 
One who loves in freedom”. He continually relates God’s freedom to God’s 
love. Moltmann, however, sees various ambiguities in this, stating:
…either God loves as one who is free, who could just as well not 
love; or his freedom is not distinguished from his love at all, and he 
is free as the One who loves. In the first case there is still an arbitrary 
element, which makes responding love difficult. In the second case 
there is a tautology. (1993a:55)
For this reason, Moltmann then chooses the concept of freedom belonging 
to the language of community and fellowship; mutual participation in 
life, communication without lordship or servitude, becoming free beyond 
the limitations of individuality. “God demonstrates his eternal freedom 
through his suffering and his sacrifice, through his self-giving and his 
patience”, whereby God keeps humanity, God’s image and God’s world, 
God’s creation, free and pays the price for our freedom (1993a:56).
The notion of liberty in Moltmann’s theology is thus radically different 
from the liberty advocated by Robert Nozick, who understood is as the 
freedom to act in any way that a person might choose, not restricted in any 
way by others; the highest level of individualism. Although Nozick did also 
concede that the freedom of some might have to be restricted in order to 
benefit the freedom of others, his theory remains staunchly individualistic 
and one that does not take the interrelationship between human beings 
into account, even less so the interrelationship between human beings and 
the earth.
From this individualistic perspective, the utilisation of biotechnology such 
as GE can indeed be incorporated in making sure that our children are 
better off than others, and focusing only on ourselves and our children; 
their future, their talents, their health… It is, however, not compatible with 
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the idea of Christian freedom in community and relationship with God 
and others that Moltmann develops, at least not without also taking social 
inequality and distributive justice into account. One could develop an 
entire argument focusing only on this matter of social justice, which I have 
also recently done. In this article, however, I only mention it in relation to 
the arguments on autonomy and freedom.
Conclusion
Moltmann indicates “Christian identification with the crucified Christ 
means solidarity with the sufferings of the poor and the misery both of 
the oppressed and the oppressors” (1993b:25). For the Christian ethical 
discussion on GE, this would mean that human dignity, as humanity created 
imago Dei must be respected, and that this dignity should not infringe on 
the created dignity of nature and other living things. Respecting human 
dignity could be interpreted in some circles as respecting the human 
genome as it exists in nature and that any interference would be a violation 
of the human dignity of the individual involved. Together with Moltmann, 
however, I disagree with this type of discourse and instead deem it a breach 
of the human dignity of the affected individual when the technology exists 
that is able to repair genetic defects or heal a crippling hereditary disease. 
Respecting the human dignity of that individual, which includes the right 
to a life of dignity, may very well rather mean offering him or her every 
chance at a life of dignity, even when that should be materialised through 
biotechnological intervention. It is unclear why healing hereditary ailments 
and genetic defects would threaten the notion of human dignity. What 
reasonable person would not want the inherent human right to dignity 
exercised on their behalf, when the alternative is lifelong suffering from the 
affliction of a genetic disorder that would otherwise have been preventable?
In arguing that the concept of human beings created in the image of God 
does not have to rule out all forms of GE, I would like to emphasise the 
difference between healing and enhancement.7 In claiming that GE can be 
7 I concede that this is a very difficult distinction to make and one that had been subject 
to much debate. I use healing though GE here to refer only to the genetic alteration that 
prevents genetic disorder from materialising.
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utilised and sanctioned as compatible with the Christian view of human 
beings created imago Dei, it is the utilisation of these types of technology 
for the purposes of curing hereditary diseases and repair genetic defects 
that is being referred to. As previously indicated, Moltmann also explicitly 
states:
Of course therapeutic interventions are permissible if their aim is to 
heal. But manipulations designed to breed living things lacking in 
the human quality of ‘subjecthood’, and manipulations the purpose 
of which is to breed so-called supermen, destroy the essential nature 
of human beings, and hence the dignity of humanity too. (1999:126)
Moltmann affirms that the first step into the realm of freedom is the 
mastery of nature through science and technology, given that the distinct 
history of humanity with nature begins with the progressive freedom of 
human beings from their dependency on nature and their progressive self-
determination. The attaining of power, however, is not yet the determination 
of how that power will be utilised (1993a:213).
The ethos of learning to live with brokenness, imperfection and 
vulnerability that Moltmann propagates, also be referring to the suffering 
of and vulnerability of God, is of immense value to the discourse of GE. 
Moltmann especially referred to the reality that God is seen most clearly 
in God’s broken and vulnerable humanity. In his understanding the whole 
of creation through the event of the cross, this also becomes especially 
applicable. Moltmann’s trinitarian doctrine of creation helps the Christian 
bioethical discussion on GE in explicitly campaigning for the utilisation 
of available biotechnologies to heal and cure, thereby enhancing human 
dignity and equal opportunity as part also of the human rights discourse. 
In addition, Moltmann’s theology also helps Christian bio-ethical 
discourse by resisting a culture or ethos that cannot live with vulnerability. 
Moltmann looks at creation and human beings through the lens of God who 
suffers in and through Jesus Christ. Although I derive from his theology 
a theological mandate in favour of GE, I by no means infer from him a 
flight from vulnerability, brokenness and suffering that aims to become 
‘transhuman’. I do not infer from his position an idealisation and even 
idolisation of medical technology. His theological perspectives do indeed 
encourage us to support medical, scientific and technological progress. It 
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supports the quest for health and health care, but also acknowledges the 
limitations in the best that we can achieve as human beings.
Moltmann’s public theological, human dignity and Christian freedom 
focus helps us to address bio-ethical challenges in the context of inequality, 
especially in a country like South Africa and helps us to build a life of 
dignity also for the socio-eluded ones in society and therefore, to work for 
socio-economic conditions that make this technology accessible to all. 
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